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A Canadian's View of the 
Battle of Piattsburgh. 



A Canadian's View of the 
Battle of New Orleans. 



The Century of Peace and 
its Significance. 



Addresses by 

WILLIAM RENWICK RIDDELL, 

Justice of the Supreme Conrt of Ontaxio. 








c- 



A Canadian's View of the Battle of 

Plattsburgh. 

Address at the Banquet at Plattsburgh, N.Y., given by the 
State of New York in celebration of the Centenary 
of the Battle of Plattsburgh. 

(Note— Such parts as are merely introductory or of only local or temporary 

interest are omitted.) 

********** 

It is of splendid augury that a great State thinks it 
fitting to ask to help in the celebration of the Centenary 
of a battle, citizens of a neighbouring state whose flag 
suffered there a reverse; and it is of even grander sig- 
nificance that these citizens accept that invitation with 
pleasure and, indeed, with eagerness. You of the State 
of New York see nothing extraordinary, much less im- 
proper, in inviting us to rejoice with you in the gladness 
of your nation; and we, Canadians to the finger-tips, 
Britons to the last drop of our blood, cordially unite 
with you in the glory of your inheritance. 

For the true significance of this occasion is not the 
victory and the defeat, but the adumbration of a hun- 
dred years of peace. We Canadians naturally and 
necessarily look at the war of 1 81 2 from a different point 
of view from that of the American. Patriotism is cruel, 
and cannot be expected to be other than unjust. We 
probably would not agree as to the real causes of the 
war, its necessity, the propriety of the means adopted 
on either side; but we can all agree that those engaged 
in it proved themselves not unworthy of their high 
descent, their fighting stock; that on neither side did 
the actual combatants wish to leave off, but both longed 



'to avenge defeat and to enhance victory, and that it was 
the sound common sense of the nations at large and their 
sense of fundamental unity which compelled a cessation 
of the fratricidal slaughter, useless as it was terrible. 

The descendant of Cavalier and Roundhead can 
join in praise of their ancestors in the Revolution of the 
seventeenth century and can forget the disputes which 
divided them. These ancestors were of the same peo- 
ple, though divided by their different views as to Royal 
Government. So, too, the time is rapidly approaching 
when the descendants of the Roundhead and Cavalier 
of the Revolution of the eighteenth century — the Con- 
tinental and the Loyalist — may join in recognizing the 
merits of their ancestors; for these, too, were of the same 
people, though they also were divided by their views of 
government. 

I do not forget, either, that since then, there have 
been many thousands of the citizens of the one State 
who have made their home in the other. Their descen- 
dants claim to be true-born Americans or Canadians; 
rather reminding one of the Frenchman who on the day 
of his naturalization in England said he felt much 
elated, for " to-day I conquered at Waterloo, while yes- 
terday I was defeated." There are to-day many tens 
of thousands of Americans who conquered at Platts- 
burgh, whose ancestors were there defeated. 

Were that battle but the victory of an American over 
a British force, much as I love the American nation, my 
altruism would not rise, could not be expected to rise, to 
the height of heartily rejoicing with them on this anni- 
versary. Your flag I esteem and honour, mine own I 
love and revere — your glory I rejoice in, for we be 
brethren; the glory of Britain is my very own, a herit- 
age to which I was born, no jot or tittle of which will I 
ever willingly give up. 

Nothing which has been said of the braverv of the 
forces on cither side, of the skill and determination of 
Macdonough, the dogged valour of the ill-fated Downie, 
but I cordially endorse. I can even look with equan- 
imity upon the retreat of Prevost and set it over against 



3 

the surrender of Hull the year before — in either case the 
weaker man succumbed. I do not intend to say any- 
thing of the battle itself, or of those who took part in it. 
It is not the battle, but its effects which will be the sub- 
ject of my remarks; and these effects have been for the 
benefit not only of the United States but of Canada and 
of Britain — yea, of the whole world itself, civilized and 
uncivilized. 

I do not pretend to give the Canadian view of the 
battle. I fancy the views taken by Canadians of this 
battle are as varied as those taken by Americans or 
Englishmen; and I do no more than give you the view 
of one Canadian, proud of the name. 

It is a remarkable circumstance that from the very 
beginning of the war the American Government was 
sincerely desirous of peace. A great wrong was done 
to President Madison by a whole political party in charg- 
ing him with a desire for war in order to better his 
political fortunes; but this charge still makes itself heard 
from time to time. It is most true that from the South 
and West came an insistent cry for war, which it was 
found impossible to resist; and from the same quarters 
the cry continued, during the whole period of the war, 
for its continuance. 

New England and New York opposed the war as 
long as they could, but their influence was not sufficient. 
While it was wholly unjust to label the war as " Madi- 
son's War," as was done at the time and has since 
continued in some quarters, it would not be very far 
from the truth to call it " Henry Clay's War." The 
opposition of Clay and his friends, the Administration 
had to face and to meet; and notwithstanding that 
opposition, Madison from the very beginning did all 
humanly possible to bring about a cessation of hostilities 
— except one thing. The abrogation of the Orders in 
Council before knowledge by Britain of the Declaration 
of War left only impressment as a substantial grievance; 
for we may safely disregard the charges of incitement 
of the Indians against Americans and the more or less 
indefinite complaints in respect of violation of the rights 



4 

of neutrals. These were a makeweight, they helped to 
turn a period and to point an invective; but they were 
largely illusory and without solid foundation. 

The War Hawk element insisted that impressment 
was after all the real issue to be determined, the real 
cause of the war; and no Administration could be strong 
enough to fail to insist upon the demand which the 
United States made for an express renunciation by 
Britain of the asserted right and the practice of board- 
ing American merchant vessels on the high seas and 
taking therefrom such sailors as her capturer should 
decide were British subjects. This claim was undoubt- 
edly exercised sometimes in much the same way as a 
slaveholder would exercise a right to go amongst the 
blacks and select for his service such negroes as he should 
consider were not free; and the lot of the impressed man 
was worse than that of the slave in that he was exposed 
to the dangers of battle, if better in that it was not neces- 
sarily for life and was not transmitted to his children. 
Terrible as were the outrages perpetrated upon Amer- 
ican citizens, Madison would never have declared war 
for that cause alone. Nor was he under any delusion 
as to the nature of the war. His biographer calls it 
a " wretched war . . . foolishly called the second 
war of independence." He was not the man for a war 
president, and he knew it — and he certainly did not 
wish war for its own sake. But without abandoning 
what he could not abandon, he did all possible to bring 
about the return of peace. 

When immediately after the declaration of war. 
Admiral Warren came across the Atlantic asking for 
peace, he was most courteously received, and every dis- 
position shown favourable to his mission. The one 
thing, however, that the Administration could not give 
up was an undertaking by Britain to abandon impress- 
ment. That granted, an armistice would have followed 
immediately; and it is almost certain that satisfactory 
terms of peace would have been arranged. But that 
was the one thing Warren could not accede to and 
Britain could not accede to. Rightly or wrongly, the 



5 

British people almost without exception looked upon 
the right of impressment as absolutely necessary to the 
security of their country. No government would stand 
for a day which even suggested giving up that right, a 
right given by common law and, in effect, asserted by 
Magrja Charta. 

Jonathan Russell shortly afterwards was instructed 
to negotiate for an armistice. He made the proposition 
to Castlereagh; but Russell also made the same stipula- 
tion that Monroe had made to Warren, and was con- 
temptuously rebuffed. Russell found that the view 
taken by most of his countrymen then, as it is now, of 
the importance of the war was not shared then — as it is 
not now— by the English-speaking across the sea. 
Americans, because it was their first war, and, still more, 
Canadians, because it was waged in large part on their 
soil, are wont to magnify the war, making it one of the 
great struggles of history; the American and Canadian 
school-books were (perhaps still are) full of the story 
of that conflict. Englishmen then and now looked and 
look upon it as an insignificant and regrettable episode 
in the midst of a real fipht, the life and death struggle 
with Napoleon for freedom and indeed for national 
existence. 

An offer by the Czar of Russia to mediate was 
eagerly grasped by Madison, though reiected with irri- 
tation, even scant courtesy, bv the British Govern- 
ment; the substitute offer of Castlereagh to negotiate 
direct was even more promptly accepted by the United 
States. The President wisely appointed Henry Clay 
one of the Commissioners; he would certainly fight for 
American rights to the last and at the same time he 
would be across the Atlantic and unable effectually to 
balk or even to embarrass the government in any steps 
they might take towards peace. 

It is impossible not to recognize that at no time would 
Britain have agreed to abandon the practice of impress- 
ment; Bayard and Gallatin saw this and made it per- 
fectly clear to the Washington administration; their 
instructions that Britain must agree to this, they knew 
to be hopeless of accomplishment and they said so in 



6 

plain terms. In Monroe's letter of June 23rd, 1814, to 
the envoys at Ghent it was still considered imperative 
that impressment, an " essential cause of the war . . . 
should be removed." But the letters of Bayard and 
Gallatin, as well as other information from Europe, in- 
duced the President, with the approval of his Cabinet, 
Monroe, Campbell, Armstrong, Jones (Rush was 
absent), to decide, four days thereafter, to authorize a 
treaty of peace silent on the subject; and the Commis- 
sioners were so advised immediately. 

An American writer says of this step, " Madison's 
Administration humbled itself to an abandonment of the 
claim for exemption from impressment" (Steven's 
" Life of Gallatin," p. 329). If this is intended as a 
rebuke I cannot assent. It is good statesmanship as it 
is good politics to abandon anything one cannot get, 
unless that abandonment be dishonourable or the thing 
necessary. (It is at least possible that other Presidents 
would have been well advised had they not insisted 
upon an empty formality which they had been refused.) 
No one but a fool keeps running his head against a stone 
wall. Britain in her existing state of mind would as 
soon have given up her national integritv as the right to 
impress for her navy. The downfall of Napoleon had 
made it very improbable that there would soon again 
arise a necessity for impressment: and Madison was 
wise not to continue a war for a form. 

There met at Ghent, John Quincy Adams, an intro- 
spective Puritan sincerely a lover of peace, and Henry 
Clay a card-playing, pleasure-loving Cavalier who hated 
England and all her works and honestly believed that 
a few more years of war would bring her to her knees; 
with these were Bayard le Chevalier sans peur et sans 
reproche as his namesake of old, and Albert Gallatin, to 
my mind the ablest, most devoted, least selfish American 
of his time, one who has never recei\'ed his due meed of 
praise. All these were men of very great ability; and 
with them was associated Jonathan Russell who was by 
no means a fool, though his inexplicable conduct a few 
years later in the episode of the " Duplicate Letters," 



in which he delivered himself into his opponent's hands, 
would almost brand him as such. 

On the other side were Lord Gambier, who could 
command a ship or a squadron but not himself; Dr. Wil- 
liam Adams, an able lawyer at his own Bar, but other- 
wise incompetent, and Henry Goulburn, afterwards 
Secretary of State. Of these, Goulburn alone rose even 
to mediocrity, and he but little, if any, above it. 

These Commissioners met at Ghent, and it very soon 
became apparent that the British representatives v/ere 
not anxious for peace. This was a matter of astonish- 
ment to those from the United States, who seem to have 
believed., as so many have believed since, that Britain 
was at her last gasp. The fact is that any reverses she 
may have suffered were as nothing compared with the 
mighty victories she had achieved in Europe; and she 
never looked upon the American War as a serious matter. 

Territory she desired from the United States; a road 
from Halifax to Quebec, the control of the Great 
Lakes, room for a buffer land to be occupied by Indian 
allies; all of these were as impossible for the United 
States to grant as it was for Britain to grant exemption 
from impressment; and peace seemed hopeless. 

To better her position, she determined upon invasion. 
In taking this step she was undoubtedly influenced by 
an erroneous view she had of the sentiment of many of 
the American people. New England and New York 
had voted against the war; during or before the war a 
whole political party had vehemently inveighed against 
it with solemn warning that it would destroy the Union; 
Massachusetts had declared and acted upon her detesta- 
tion of the invasion of Canada; the Assembly of New 
York had, in February, 1814, in their reply to Governor 
Tompkins, savagely assailed the General Government; 
the Governor thought and said that " the Assembly had 
too much Massachusetts leaven in it to do anything 
favourable to the support of the country," and many 
Englishmen believed a great part of the American 
people were ready to revolt. 



8 

This idea was sheer folly. It was not understood 
that " ever since the adoption of the Constitution there 
was one thing that orators, North or South, inside the 
Halls of Congress and outside them, were agreed upon, 
that in all debates there was one argument equally good 
on both sides and to which there could be no reply . . . 
the solemn warning or the angry threat . . . that 
the bonds of the Union in one or another contingency 
were to be rent asunder." That kind of talk received 
its quietus only in the blood and agony of the great 
Civil War. 

The belief that many Americans were disloyal to 
their country when they were simply opposed to the 
party in power was not unnatural; and yet Englishmen 
should have known better, for they knew that those most 
bitter in denunciation of His Majesty's Government 
were loyal to the core. The same mistake was made 
by General Hull, Governor Tompkins and many other 
Americans in respect of Canadians. Hull's proclama- 
tion is too well known to require quotation, Tompkins 
thought that Canadians would flock to the American 
standard. Clay that an army could march unopposed 
through Canada to dictate peace at Quebec or Halifax; 
so later on in our little Rebellion of 1837. the Sympa- 
thizers, and at the invasion of 1866, the Fenians, im- 
plicitly believed that all they had to do was to fly the 
flag of revolt and Canadians would join them almost to 
a man. It was the same mistake as was made by the 
South half a century ago when it was firmly believed 
that the Democrats of the North would take its part, 
or at least would not take part against it. But Sergeant 
Tillman Joy was not the only " old-fashioned Dem- 
ocrat" who laid his "politics away on the shelf to wait 
till the war was through." 

Gallatin thoroughly appreciated this belief and its 
effect in England, and warned his home authorities that 
while the best they could hope for was the status quo 
ante bellum, they could not expect even that unless the 
American people were united. Seen from the other 
side of the Atlantic, New England seemed ready to break 



J 





away from the Union; and there can be httle doubt that 
in England it was thought that no real resistance would 
be made by the people of those parts to an invasion and 
conquest. 

England radically misconceived the opinion held of 
Rer by Americans; she could not get over the idea — she 
has not yet — that she was the mother of America and 
was looked upon with the same tenderness and love, not 
to say respect and reverence, as a mother in the flesh. 
Thus only is explained the pained amazement with 
which the declaration of war had been received. 

No one but the very ardent patriot (in him every- 
thing is excused) looks upon the war of 1812 as an 
assault upon democracy; that " the supremacy of dem- 
ocracy and the progress of its ideals and purposes in " 
this country were contested. No one imagines that the 
war was begun or desired by Britain; but having been 
begun, no one doubts that Britain was not willing to 
leave off without some advantage. I venture to think 
that Britain was not desirous of acquiring territory 
occupied by those who would not cheerfully accept her 
flag. She had had much trouble a few years before in 
Ireland and more in America, and one Bunker Hill was 
enough. I think that she desired to cut off New Eng- 
land from the rest of the Union, not that she might add 
that region to her territory against the will of its inhabi- 
tants, but for strategic reasons and as a counter in the 
game to be played at Ghent. 

The brilliant quintette of Americans met the blunder- 
ing tactics of their opponents with much skill. The 
team play was superb, if the practice games amongst 
themselves and away from the Stadium were exhibitions 
of petulance, wilfulness and sectional selfishness. The 
British Commissioners were no doubt hampered by their 
instructions, but even these and the constant interference 
of their Government cannot explain, much less justify, 
their ineptitude. If Henry Goulburn had kept a diary 
like John Quincy Adams, and been equally honest with 
himself and frank in his disclosures. I think it would 
prove as instructive as the delightful self-exhibition 



10 

given us by Adams, and probably even more interesting 
and illuminating. Equally with the Americans they 
were amazed at the stand of their antagonists for they, 
too, thought peace would be welcomed on any terms; 
they skirmished for time. 

America had, in fact, if not explicitly, given up all 
claim to better terms than the status quo ante helium; 
formal instructions to that effect had not yet been sent, 
but it was an open secret that nothing better would be 
insisted upon. The wrangle (for it was not much if 
any more dignified than a wrangle) between Adams and 
Clay, would not prevent the conclusion of a treaty; and 
in substance it was the claims of the British Commis- 
sioners which stood in the way. 

The Battle of Plattsburgh proved that there were no 
lukewarm Americans, no veiled treason, when it came 
to desecration of American soil. Federalist was as 
active as Republican, just as a quarter of a century later 
in Upper Canada the Radical carried a musket by the 
side of the high Tory in defence of his land. There- 
after there was no talk of opposing the Central Govern- 
ment. The Assembly of this State which in February 
had assailed its honesty and capacity, which could but 
grudgingly admire the prowess of the troops in defend- 
ing their " Country eighteen months after the com- 
mencement of a war which the American people were 
told was to put the Canadas in our possession in six 
months from the time it was declared," now (October 
9th), became more patriotic, if possible, than Governor 
Tompkins himself, rejoiced that the foe had failed in 
" the mighty efforts of his power to destroy this last 
Republic on earth " and refused to place reliance on 
former professions " calculated to authorize the belief 
that he was disposed to renew amicable relations with 
us on terms compatible with our independence and 
national dignity." And they undertook that " provid- 
ing for the common defence of the State and nation, 
a well organized and efficient corps of uniformed troops" 
should be the leading object of their deliberations. 

In June the Legislature of the State of New York 



11 

had seriously contemplated removal to New York City; 
in October the tone of confidence and triumph is every- 
where heard, and the Senate was well justified in boast- 
ing of the unanimity and patriotism of all classes of the 
community in the existing crisis; we can forgive the 
suggestion that possibly the war was continued from 
" hostility to our civil institutions." The Governor, 
great in everything but orthography, was praised now 
by all for measures taken to defend the State, not long 
before rather looked on with suspicion. 

Nor did New York stand alone. New England, 
while reluctant to aid in a vain attempt to conquer 
Canada, in the second campaign of 1814 gave more 
recruits than all the Southern States, Massachusetts 
indeed more than any other State in the Union. 

Thus was made manifest the justice of the assertion 
of the American Commissioners that their giving up any 
part of the territory of the United States instead of 
making for peace would perpetuate hatred and ill will. 
" The conditions proposed by Great Britain . 
are dishonourable to the United States in demanding 
from them to abandon territory and a portion of their 
citizens. ... A treaty concluded in such terms 
would be but an armistice. It cannot be supposed that 
America would long submit . . . nor recur to 
arms for the recovery of her territory. . . . Instead 
of settling existing difficulties such a peace would only 
create new causes of war, sow the seeds of a permanent 
hatred and lay the foundation of hostilities for an indefi- 
nite period." It was perfectly plain that no consider- 
able section of Americans were willing to change their 
allegiance. That fact in itself was sufficient to discour- 
age any further attempt in that quarter. 

The American Commissioners were heartened by the 
result of this invasion. They had believed that an inva- 
sion would unite their fellow-countrymen; their faith 
was justified and they now knew they could rely on 
proper support from home. 

The British Government, the real negotiators, the 
ostensible negotiators being but puppets, now knew' that 



12 

nothing was to he gained by invasion. The subsequent 
attack on Washington was avowedly an act of retaha- 
tion for the destruction of York, Newark, Fort George; 
and permanent conquest was never there contemplated. 
The later attempt on New Orleans was possibly for con- 
quest, but New Orleans was not yet, in fact, American- 
ized, and no small number of the inhabitants of city and 
surrounding country were not wholly reconciled to 
American rule. 

Not only was it made manifest that Americans were 
unanimous in defending their national life, but it was 
as manifest that they were capable of doing so. All 
hope of success through divided counsels was gone; 
and then at last the British Commissioners were in- 
structed to abandon their contention for an advantage, 
and to be placed in a better position than before the war. 
To the honour of Britain be it said that she refused to 
abandon her Red friends and the Indians participated 
in the benefit of peace. 

It were an interesting speculation to try to determine 
what would have happened had the result of the battle 
been different. Suppose the invading army and navy 
triumphant, they would probably have made their way 
down the Hudson to New York and separated New 
England from the remainder of the Union. It is incon- 
ceivable that the part thus cut off could be permanently 
conquered. New England could not be made part of 
Old England without its own consent, and that consent 
is unthinkable. There was probably more in the move- 
ment resulting in the Hartford Convention than Theo- 
dore Dwight allows to meet the eye, but there was never 
real discontent with republican institutions or a real 
desire for the old monarchy; and indeed nothing worse 
could have happened to Britain herself than the 
reabsorption of any populated part of the Union under 
such circumstances. Let Alsace and Lorraine tell the 
tale — " Alsace " and " Lorraine " still, after more than 
forty years, and not Elsass and Lothringen in the hearts 
of their people. Let Ireland speak, but now after cen- 



13 

turies of sorrow and turmoil becoming mistress of her- 
self and therefore reconciled to the Sassenach. 

But the war would have been prolonged, blood and 
treasure would have been poured out, the problems made 
less simple of settlemicnt. We can hardly imagine Britain 
consenting to call quits without some recompense for the 
death of her sons and the waste of her money. The 
practice had not yet arisen of requiring a money indem- 
nity, and territory was the only means of payment. 
The cession of any populated territory was impossible 
unless and until the United States was beaten to its 
knees. A little less objection might have been taken to 
the cession of some almost uninhabited land of the north- 
east. There Britain certainly desired a road uniting her 
Maritime Provinces with the Canadas; but can anyone 
imagine the cession of one foot of American soil without 
bitter heartburnings and a legacy of hate ? Ask a Cana- 
dian what he thinks of Alaska, and judge from his feel- 
ings in respect of land he has lost by the adjudication of 
an international tribunal, what those of an American 
would be concerning land he was forced to give up by 
the strong hand. Better war for an indefinite period 
with a hope of honourable peace at the end than a peace 
which could be no peace, because it brought with it abid- 
ing and eternal discord and hatred 

It is extraordinary that Adams did not appreciate 
the effect of a cession of territory by Britain. We find 
him arguing to the British Commissioners that it was in 
the interest of Britain not less than of the United States 
that Canada should be ceded. 

But, then, it has always been difficult for the Ameri- 
can to understand Canada. In 1866 the Reciprocity 
Treaty was abrogated to force Canada into the Republic, 
and about the same time Sumner was assuring Britain 
that there could be no hope of a genuine friendship 
between the nations until Canada was ceded. 

Cession was, in 1814, out of the question; and 
Plattsburgh made possible a peace on even terms, a 
peace into which each nation could enter without loss 



14 

of prestige; peace with honour which could be the basis 
for a long and harmonious friendship. 

Even the " Mill Boy of the Slashes," who was ready 
for a war three years longer, though he thought the 

treaty " a d d bad one," wrote Monroe (December 

25th, 1814), "the terms undoubtedly are not such as 
our country expected at the commencement of the war. 
Judged of, however, by the actual condition of things; 
. . . they cannot be pronounced very unfavourable. 
We lose no territory, I think no honour." 

The people of the United States were delighted, so 
were those of Great Britain. Of course some of the 
politicians, some of the papers, pretended to be 
chagrined at the result, but that was politics. It is 
amazing, as it is amusing, to see these ephemeral lucu- 
brations taken by serious historians as serious history. 
A Canadian who remembers the Treaty of Washington 
and how it was received in Canada by a whole political 
party, should have no difficulty in estimating these at 
their real value. I shall mention to an American 
audience no treaty more recent than Jay's; I might be 
treading on dangerous ground were I to suggest that 
not uncommonly treaties like all other acts of State are 
likely to be taken advantage of for political purposes. 

The peace of Ghent was the result of the Battle of 
Plattsburgh. That battle induced both nations to agree 
to the Rush Bagot convention of 1817, which freed our 
international waters from pollution by the keel of a 
ship of war (let us hope and pray, forever.) It laid the 
foundation for a century of peace. 



A Canadian's View of the Battle of 

New Orleans. 

Address at the Centenary Dinner at the Hotel Grunewald, 
New Orleans, January 9th, 1915. 

(Note^Such parts as are merely introductory or have only a local or 
temporary interest are omitted.) 

I have the very great honour and pleasure of repre- 
senting here Ontario, the Queen Province of the Domin- 
ion, and in that capacity of bringing to the people of the 
United States, and especially to the people of the State 
of Louisiana, the hearty greetings of their northern 
Sister. 



The occasion enhances the pleasure which a visit to 
New Orleans must needs give a Canadian. We have 
for more than two years been celebrating the centennial 
of battles, victories on one side or the other, in that in- 
consequent fratricidal strife of one hundred years ago. 
Yesterday was the centennial of the Battle of New 
Orleans, and there will be no more to be celebrated — it 
is quite too much to expect that our friends of Alabama 
will invite us to celebrate with them the last military 
operation of the war, when on the 12th February, 1815, 
" the garrison " of the Fort near Mobile, " consisting of 
400 men of the 2nd American Regiment," after the sur- 
render of the day before, " marched out with all the 
honours of war and laid down their arms upon the 
glacis." We are through with battles; and while I am 
glad to do full honour to the gallant men who fought on 

15 



c 



either side, I rejoice that we have no more battles to 
celebrate. What we celebrate now and to-night is not 
the war and the struggle between our peoples, not the 
last battle our peoples fought against each other, but 
the beginning of that century of peace which is their 
pride and boast. 

You have said that never during that century has 
either country seen within its territory armed forces of 
the other, that is not strictly correct. The other day 
a Colonel of the United States Army told me that he 
expected the following week to march his command four 
miles in Canada. I replied that he might, if he would, 
march them four thousand miles in Canada, and receive 
a welcome at every mile. This was, however, a friendly 
and not a hostile raid. 

Not many months ago, speaking on a similar occas- 
sion at Pittsburgh, I said that the Battle of Pitts- 
burgh made the Treaty of Peace possible, because it had 
its effect in bringing the British to moderate their de- 
mands so that terms honourable to all could be agreed 
ypon — Peace with Honour could be assured. The Bat- 
tle of Plattsburgh made the peace possible; the Battle 
of New Orleans, in my view, made it palatable and 
therefore permanent. In saying this, I do not affect to 
give the official Canadian view — if there is such a view 
— not the Canadian view, but one Canadian's view, 
which may or may not recommend itself to others, 
Canadians or otherwise. 

In considering the course of that extraordinary last 
" Anglo-Saxon War " I have found it well to study 
chiefly the writings of Americans contemporary and sub- 
sequent. Canadian writers are wont to magnify all the 
circumstances of that war — not unnaturally, since their 
land it was which suffered most from its ravages; their 
land it was whose development was delayed a quarter 
of a century or more by that war. English writers, on 
the other hand, cannot be got to look upon it as of any 
consequence; they seem to regard it at the worst and 
at most as an inconvenient and regrettable but unimport- 



17 

ant episode in the midst of a life and death struggle with 
an Emperor determined to achieve world power and 
backed by a people unanimous — enthusiastically un- 
animous — in his support. I do not mean to say that 
American writers are impartial; they are not; but the 
facts can be gathered from them, and allowing a judic- 
ious discount, their inter-relation and significance can 
be fairly arrived at. 

From American sources it is plain that the war was 
not popular in New England and New York. The ships 
in Boston Harbour hung their flags at half-mast when 
war was declared; the Administration from the begin- 
ning to the end came in for unlimited criticism, and 
what we in this more gentle and considerate age would 
call abuse. The East did not contribute many troops, 
comparatively speaking, until invasion was threatened 
on her own shores, and then rather for protection than 
attack. 

The mainspring of the war was Henry Clay, the 
" Millboy of the Slashes "; his War Hawk Party were 
its most ardent advocates; and the charge of Madison's 
political opponents that the declaration of war was for 
political purposes must be discounted so far, at least, as 
it refers to any political scheme of the President's own. 

Madison, then, was very wise to send Henry Clay 
as one of the American Commissioners to consider the 
terms of peace, and Clay had an infinitely difficult task 
to perform. He probably did not himself desire peace 
on any terms — at least, not for a time; his party certainly 
did not, unless the humiliation of Britain accompanied 
or preceded it; nevertheless, he was compelled ostensibly 
to work for peace; he could not take an open stand 
against the peace desiderated bv his Government. 

After the instructions of the President to the Amer- 
ican Commissioners to give up the demand that Britain 
should formally abandon her claim to search American 
ships on the high seas and to take therefrom British- 
born sailors, settlement on the basis of status quo ante 
helium was well in sight. Two things were to be 
feared: the anger of the West and the jibe of the East. 



18 

That the East would sneer was certain. Witness what 
was said in the New York Evening; Post of November 
11th, 1814: 

" Thomas Jefferson deputed two Ministers 
to Great Britain for the ostensible purpose of 
negotiating a treaty with that power. These 
men, Messrs. Munroe and Pinkney, high in the 
favour of the President, concluded a treaty with 
the British Commissioners on the 31st Decem- 
ber, 1806. This treaty, on its arrival in this 
country, Mr. Jefferson REJECTED because it 
contained no stipulation on the part of Great 
Britain to relinquish the right to search mer- 
chant vessels for deserters; rejected it, too, with- 
out laying it before the Senate, thus assuming 
the sole responsibility of all the evil which might 
follow. 

" This peremptory rejection by Mr. Jefferson 
of a treaty which, if accepted, would probably 
have invigorated our commerce and given a new 
impulse to our prosperity, was universally con- 
sidered as indicating on the part of this Govern- 
ment, so long as democracy wielded it, an un- 
alterable determination never to conclude a 
treaty with England UNTIL SHE FORMALLY SUR- 
RENDERED THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. NOW MARK 
THE CONTRAST: 

" Thus we see that after a period of seven 
years in which the country has groaned under 
Embargoes, Non Importation and Non Inter- 
course acts, with a large progeny of enforcing 
laws, abridging and almost annihilating Civil 
Liberty, a period of three years of which has 
been marked by a disastrous war, Madison is 
compelled to abandon his predecessor's ground, 
and solicit the very terms which Jefferson 
rejected." 

And the New York Evening Post was by no means the 
most waspish of the Eastern journals. 



10 

But if peace should not be obtained, the danger in that 
part of the country seemed even more threatening. More 
than one paper urged the legahty, and more than hinted 
at the advisahihty, of the North-East withdrawing from 
the Union. The Connecticut Spectator, the Boston 
Gazette, the Boston Daily Advertiser and Portsmouth 
Oracle were outspoken, while the more conservative 
Hartford Courant and Columbia Centinel were not far 
behind. Calhoun was by no means the first Nullifier; 
and it is not all unlikely that there was more in the Hart- 
ford Convention than its annalist permits us to see. 

In that part of the country there was no great loss 
of popularity to be feared bv the signing of a Peace 
Treaty. In the South and West, however, peace with- 
out the humiliation of Britain was certain to cause an 
outbreak of angry passion. No one could forget the 
treatment meted out twenty years before to John Jay 
when he returned with a treaty which did not fulfil the 
hopes of a large party in the United States. 

John Jay, of whom Daniel Webster said: "When 
the spotless ermine of the judicial robe fell on lohn lay 
it touched nothing less spotless than itself" — John Jay, 
the Chief Justice of the United States, was openly 
charged with selling his country; he was accused of the 
worst and most despicable motives: he was hanged in 
effigy, he lost the dearest hope of his heart, the Presi- 
dency of the United States — because he had not 
achieved the impossible and had not brought home a 
treatv which Britain refused to give. 

All this, the Commissioners knew — and it is to the 
credit of all of them — most, perhaps to the credit of 
Henry Clav — that they affixed their signatures to a 
treaty which bade fair to engulf them all in popular 
opprobrium. In my humble judgment Henry Clay has 
never received the credit which was his due for this act 
of self-abnegation. 

Had there been an Atlantic cable at that time it is 
more than likely that the Commissioners would have 
been received with execration : but before the news of the 
Treaty reached the Republic, the whole atmosphere was 



20 

changed. Pakenham's attack on New Orleans had been 
repulsed, the riflemen of the Mississippi Valley had 
verified the boast of their adniired leader that they were 
a match, and more than a match, for Britain's best and 
bravest; the Red Coat had again been defeated by the 
Butternut on American soil. In the midst of the jubi- 
lation over this event came the news of peace. The 
Valley of the Mississipoi, which was most opposed to 
peace, rejoiced in a brilliant victory of its very own, and 
was perfectlv content to let the fight end, the last round 
being in its favour. Had it not been for this victorv it is 
most likely that the inconsequent peace, leaving nothing 
gained for which war had been prodaim.ed, would have 
met with a reception such as that met by Jay's 
Treaty in 1794; but now Clay was vindicated and the 
" Britishers whipped." 

From this battle, indeed, arose the curious mvth for 
Ions sedulously taught by the school histories of the 
United Sta^^es, that the war was an almost unbroken 
series of glorious victories for its arms, that the British 
were almost evervv/here defeated, that what was dubbed 
in advance " the Second War of Independence " was as 
triumphant and successful as the first. But no great 
harm has resulted from this pleasant delusion, and it 
would be almost a pity to disturb it. 

This battle has always rem.indcd me of the Irish duel 
between a very stout man and a verv thin one. The 
stout man was not allowed his renuest that he should 
stand twice as far away from his antagonist as his 
antagonist from him, but his second made matters all 
right bv drawing vertical chalk lines on the fat man's 
bodv with a space between them equal to the width of 
the thin man, and stipulating that no hit outside of these 
lines should count. This battle was outside of the war 
and therefore " should not count " It had no effect in 
bringing about the peace; and vet it was. if anvthing, 
more effective than if i<- had been fought before the 
peace was arrived at. The West and South iubilnnt. 
and the prowess of American arms triumnhantly vindi- 
cated, the mouth of North and Fast was closed, and the 



i 



21 

whole nation was content to let bygones be bygones and 
start on a new era of peace. 

On the other side of the Atlantic the peace was 
received with what to a Canadian seems exasperating 
indifference; and the anger of Canadians, burning to 
avenge the destruction of York and Newark and the 
defeat of Put-in-Bay was ignored. Even the taunts of 
a bitter Opposition in the Houses of Parliament at West- 
minster proved incapable of rousing a war feeling. 
Britain was content. Nor was there any temptation for 
the United States to renew the conflict when the Em- 
peror again rose. Nothing had been gained bv the war, 
honour had been satisfied, and the paths of peace were 
alluring. 

So for a hundred years the English-speaking peoples 
have been at peace, and this because they believe that 
peace is the normal and predestined state of man, that 
war is not a good in itself, but is to be adopted only when 
it is the least evil of all the evil courses open, and then 
only that peace may come and abide. 

No doubt there were occasions not a few when each 
people failed in the highest justice in its conduct toward 
the other; no doubt many a time and oft other nations 
could rightly complain of the conduct of the one or the 
other toward them. 

But on the whole, and speaking generally, despite 
a hundred stumbles and falls, there has been fidelity 
to the pledged word and the dictates of the moral law. 

Some of us had hoped that the example of these two 
peoples would have taught the nations that war is un- 
necessary. That was not to be. The present terrible 
conflict may be the last; but if this hope prove in vain, 
we should not despair; the cause of peace must advance, 
though, as with the rising tide, there will be receding 
waves. 

Whatever be the fate of others, as to your nation 
andmine, I hope and believe that as between themselves 
they have finally and irrevocably decided there shall 
be eternal peace; the peace already well begun shall 
continue ad multos annos, yea, in aeternum. 



22 

For if, as we believe, there is a moral Governor of 
the Universe, governing by a moral law; if our people 
have that sense of law which equally with the starry 
heavens filled the German philosopher with awe — and 
that is my faith — it is as certain as to-morrow's tide 
that your people and mine on this Continent, over the 
Sea and around the Seven Seas, must in the future as 
in the past be firm in the determination that nothing 
shall break the bond of amity and good-will which binds 
them together. 



The Century of Peace and its 
Significance. 

An Address before the Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, 
February 22nd, 1915. 

(Note — Such parts as are merely introductory or have but a local and temporary interest 

are omitted.) 

*«f« >•« •»* fc'n »»» ^« *•• ^ Uf 

wft »»* •■1> 1* *■^•^ ^,» »4» -jl- ^ 

Within the past few months I have taken part in 
the celebration at Plattsburgh and New Orleans of note- 
worthy battles, and I have said at these places that the 
Battle of Plattsburgh made that peace possible and the 
Battle of New Orleans made it palatable, and therefore 
permanent. I have no doubt that these statements are 
wholly true, but they are not all the truth, for very 
much more than battles went to both the birth and the 
Jong life of the peace. 

The extraordinary spectacle of an international 
boundary of nearly four thousand miles existing for a 
century without a fortification and without even a gar- 
rison post has rightly attracted the attention of the 
civilized world. In length, in period of existence and in 
the pacific relations of those on either side, this boundary 
line is unique, the miracle of the nations and of the 
ages. The length rests upon geographical reasons, its 
period of existence and these relations upon the char- 
acteristics of the peoples, their ideal of life and of 
international conduct. 

Much has been said — not too much — of the identity 
of the language of the two peoples. 

We are told by those who should know that no one 
can understand the genius of a people who cannot think 
in their language and speak it. There is no little truth 

23 



24 

in that sentiment, strange as it seems at first hearing. 
For myself, reading but not spealving German, I find it 
impossible even to follow the reasoning of some of the 
Apologiae recently put forth from that land and I hope 
J fail to understand precisely what the Germans desire 
to attain through this war. 

No doubt those who speak the same language under- 
stand each other as they could not did they require an 
interpreter. But that cannot explain why the Peace has 
been kept. Athens and Thebes had substantially the 
same language: Sparta's was not more divergent from it 
than Lowland Scotch from English; yet Athens and 
Thebes and Sparta were seldom at peace inter se. Before 
the Union of the Crowns in 1603, England and Scotland 
were very frequently at war, but their language was 
practically the same. Prussia and Austria had to fight 
out their differences fifty years ago. Our common lan- 
guage enables us to know each other, indeed; and 
Charles Lamb indicated a profound truth and one credit- 
able to human nature when he said " I cannot hate a 
man I know." But there was more than language. 

Identity of descent had some effect, but 1776 and 
1860, the Revolution and the Civil War furnish a con- 
clusive proof that that was not enough. Nor was 
identity of religion, for witness Austria and France, 
Britain and Germany. 

It was the fundamental conception of international 
right and duty. 

There are only two principles of international con- 
duct worth considering: The first, " Might makes Right; 
Might is Right. I can, therefore I ought and will." 
The other, " Right is Right, and because Right is 
Right, to follow Right were wisdom in the scorn of 
consequence." 

The first of these is the principle of primeval man 
vindicating his claims by his own strong right arm, 
they " should take who have the power and they should 
keep who can." No community could exist in which 



25 

this principle was allowed to continue as the governing 
principle in matters between man and man; and accord- 
ingly within the clan there must needs arise some rule 
by which right should be determined. Right must in 
some way appear other than by mere force and violence. 
Every nation, even the most savage, has such a rule for 
its members; no nation which has none could endure. 

But in international matters, for long no such law 
was sought or applied. The foreigner was an enemy 
against whom everything was permissible, violence and 
destruction even laudable; the foreign nation had no 
rights which one's own nation was bound to respect. 
While international law has arisen and made some 
advances, it is but a wan etiolated simulacrum of law 
as applied between citizens of the same nation. It has 
no court which can effectually summon an offending 
nation; and there is no sufficiently powerful police to 
enforce its mandates. Accordingly we must at all times 
expect that the strong nation may become an aggressor 
and that sometimes the only right underlying an attack 
is Might. 

The other principle is but an extension to inter- 
national concerns of the morality and the rules adopted 
between individuals: Right is Right. 

A course of conduct may be right for several rea- 
sons; it may and its opposite may not be in accord with 
the eternal principles of the moral lav/; or, indifferent 
ethically, it may be in accord and its opposite not 
with positive legal precept; or both ethics and law being 
silent, it may be prescribed by agreement. An act trans- 
gressing the moral code, the legal code, the contract, is 
wrong. The people who commit it may be strong, 
irresistibly strong, learned, wearisomely learned, osten- 
tatiously pious, may make many excuses, explanations, 
what not — they stand a transgressor and a criminal in 
the face of Almighty God — or there is no Almighty God. 

With Might as the determining principle, the 
stronger nation demands what it desires, the weaker 
temporises and ultimately gives up what it must or has 



20 

that taken from it irrespective of the rights and wrongs. 
The stronger is the ultimate and final judge of what it 
is to receive. 

Where Right prevails, the matter in controversy may 
become a subject for diplomatic consideration indeed, 
and the question is not uncommonly apparently only 
" How little can I set off with giving up?" but the sub- 
stance always is " How much should I in justice give?" 
Might takes, Right gives. With two nations actuated by 
the law of Right, most matters can be adjusted without 
much difficulty; if diplomacy fail, the matter in dispute 
may be determined by some tribunal. 

This method is wholly inconsistent with the prin- 
ciple boldly and baldly laid dov/n in some quarters that 
" to a State a favourable verdict by a Court of Arbitra- 
tion can never be equivalent to a victory won by war." 
Such a principle is at bottom based upon the hypothesis 
that war is a good in itself — a hypothesis supposed to 
be founded in the immutable laws of nature — and human 
nature. 

We have in these days seen it stated, " War is in 
itself a good thing. It is a biological necessity." 
*' Efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, 
lead to general degeneration, as happens everv^vhere in 
nature where the struggle for existence is eliminated." 
" The State is justified in making conquests whenever 
its own advantage seems to require additional territory." 
" In fact, the State is a law unto itself. Weak nations 
have not the same right to live as powerful and vigorous 
nations." 

The propositions, repugnant as they are to our sense 
of right, are wholly intelligible as is the principle which 
necessarilv flows from them, a principle also most un- 
flinchingly advanced, that the individual exists for the 
State, not the State for the individual — a recrudescence 
of the ancient and outworn theory of the Greek to which 
many of us thought that modern civilization had given 
its quietus. 

It seems to me that the course of dealing between 



27 
the United States and Britain — amongst the English- 
speaking peoples — shows that the rules by which they 
have governed themselves in their international relation- 
ships are those prescribed by the laws of justice and 
right. 1 do not at all mean that in every case this was 
so. Hiimanum errare est; homo politiciis is not always 
homo sapiens; in too many cases, patriotism, always 
unjust, has misled the statesman on one side or the other; 
"My country, right or wrong," is a convenient rule to 
follow in peace as in war, and those in authority have 
not always been " too bright and good for human 
nature's daily food." And, too, while our methods of 
choosing rulers are as good as any yet devised, popular 
opinion is fallible, mistakes are made, the fool ye have 
always with you, and one fool can do more mischief in 
five minutes than ten man can set right in a year. 

Sometimes, indeed, mistakes have been made by 
reason of the pace with which operation must neces- 
sarily be carried on in time of war. Sometimes the 
rights of the belligerent have been placed a little too 
high, those of the neutral a little too low. 

Outside of my window at Osgoode Hall are drill- 
ing day by day from dawn to dark the flower of the 
youth of Canada, destined to become the target of can- 
non, shot and shell. Many of these I know, many are 
the sons of my best friends, they are mine own people, 
mine own flesh and blood; and when I see them prepar- 
ing themselves for a struggle which must to many mean 
wounds and agony and to no few death, even I, judge as 
I am, cannot look with too critical an eye upon means 
which may shorten that struggle and save these young 
heroes for their country even if a neutral may not make 
quite so much money as he otherwise would or might. 

It may be that the present generation of Americans 
cannot enter into these feelings; a former generation 
could and fully. Sixty years ago the people of this 
nation listened with amazement hardening into con- 
tempt to the complaint of England over her lost cotton 
imports, for that generation fighting a desperate fight 



28 

for human liberty had no patience with complaints over 
the loss of a little money and no respect for those who 
to make a profit would not hesitate to embarrass their 
struggling brethren. If that generation of Americans 
made mistakes in international law — and they did 
exercise a right against the assertion of which by 
Britain, Jefferson and Madison, Pinkney and Marshall 
protested and almost if not quite threatened war — if 
they did make mistakes I for one will not blame them. 

If you in the stress and strain of the Civil War did 
some things not strictly warranted by International Law, 
so we in the struggle against an Emperor who a hundred 
years ago fought for mastership of the world went be- 
yond the warrant given to belligerents. In a struggle 
for national existence a mere question of dollars and 
cents and neutrals' profits becomes of infinitesimal im- 
portance. If to bring a war to a successful termination, 
neutral trade must be made to suffer, it will, in most 
cases, be made to suffer. Blood is thicker than water, 
but it is also heavier than gold. 

I do not assert that either nation has always been 
blameless in its conduct toward the other. Still less do 
I say that in dealing with other nations either you or we 
have always been actuated by the highest or even by 
proper motives, that we have always been free from 
the sin of coveting what is our neighbor's or that all our 
wars were just. I am as little inclined to boast of the 
Opium Wars as you of the Mexican Expedition seventy 

vears ago. 

Buf excepiis excipiendis and speaking generally, I 
have no hesitation in saying that both nations have, in 
their dealings with each other, sought the right; the 
right whether declared by the law of God or the interna- 
tional law of human convention or determined by pre- 
vious agreement. A scrap of paper where a name was 
set we have held " as strong as honour's pledge or duty's 
debt." 

Unless I am wholly mistaken, it is precisely this 
conception of international conduct which has preserved 
for us the peace for a hundred years. 



20 

It should not be forgotten that the peace had pre- 
viously been kept for a generation — and that through 
the same rule of conduct. 

The substantive Treaty of Peace, September 3rd, 
1873, had laid down as one boundary the River St. 
Croix. No lines were drawn on the map to indi- 
cate what river this was; no note made by the 
Commissioners as to what they meant; and at least 
two rivers might reasonably be held to bear the name. 
In the United States, the feeling was as strong then 
as now that " no foot of American soil can pass from 
under the starry flag " ; Britain had for generations said 
as she now says, " What we have, we hold." All the 
^elements existed for " a just and necessary war"; but 
the two nations thought it a question of fact to be deter- 
mined by judges, and so, most tamely — some fire-eaters 
said, most ignominiously — restrained their armed forces 
and submitted the matter to three lawyers. David 
Howell, Judge of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 
and Thomas Barclay, of Annapolis, Nova Scotia, a 
pupil of John Jay's, were chosen. They two selected 
as the third, Egbert Benson, formerly a judge of the 
Supreme Court 'of New York, and afterwards judge of 
the Circuit Court of the United States, because he was 
" cool, sensible and dispassionate." 

Can you not see the indignation, hear the outraged 
cry of true patriots on either side of the Atlantic at this 
"mollycoddle" way of determining a question of 
national territory? For how could any true lover of his 
country bear to have her rights determined by anyone 
who is " cool, sensible and dispassionate"^ Why not 
adopt the easy code: " I wanted that land and I took 

it"? 

Other disputes were about the same time left to 
Boards of Arbitrators appointed by the two nations; 
how much the United States should pay British credi- 
tors; how much Britain should pay American citizens 
for the illegal seizure during the Napoleonic Wars. 

As to the former the Treaty of 1783 had stipulated 
that creditors on either side should meet no lawful 



30 

impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling 
money of all bona fide debts theretofore contracted. 
Some of the States refused to implement this agree- 
ment, and British creditors were deprived of their honest 
claims. The United States could not coerce the States, 
but they did not therefore repudiate the clause in the 
treaty — did not say, " We thought we could have this 
agreement carried out, but we cannot, accordingly we 
do not consider ourselves bound." What was said was, 
" We cannot compel the States to do the honest thing 
and the thing agreed to by us, but we will pay out of 
our own funds." And they did. 

So, too, Britain did not say, " Necessity knows no 
law, we had to seize your ships to save our nation, and 
we will not pay." What was said was, " What we did 
we did in our bitter need, but we had no right to do it, 
and we will pay the damages." 

Britain indeed absolutely refused the demand of 
Washington that she should pay for some 3,000 negro 
slaves taken away. "These," she said, "ceased to be 
slaves when they reached the British lines, and neither 
by God's law, international law nor agreement are we 
ibound to pay for them." And she did not. Nor did 
the United States go to war to try to compel her to 
do so. 

Then came the fratricidal war of 1812-14. This is 
not the time or place to consider how far it was justifi- 
able or reasonably necessary. Dignified in advance as 
the Second War of Independence, in its inception it 
nearly clove the Union in two and it ended inconsequent, 
leaving nothing decided for which it had ostensibly been 
begun and carried on. It left behind it a legacy of hate 
not yet wholly spent, in my Province it put back for 
more than a quarter of a century her progress, and if 
it did good to anybody other than a few contractors and 
Government employees, I have not been able to discover 
an instance. 

Inconsequent as it was, the sound judgment of both 
peoples insisted on it coming to an end and peace be- 
gan, never, please God, to end. 



31 

In the Treaty of Peace, the Commissioners agreed 
to the terms of the status quo ante bellum. There were, 
however, a few matters in dispute which they were not 
able to determine and which should be determined in the 
interests of peace. Thereafter the international rela- 
tions of the two peoples are largely a commentary on 
the Treaty of Peace, the Treaty of Ghent and the later 
Treaty of Washington of 1871. 

The precise position of the boundary line has 
been in controversy more than once. Down in Pas- 
samaquoddy Bay there were some islands claimed by 
both the Province of Nova Scotia and the State of Mas- 
sachusetts, a splendid chance for war for " inalienable 
national territory." The true ownership depended upon 
the interpretation of the Treaty of 1783, and the two 
Governments determined to leave the matter to two 
lawyers. Thomas Barclay was one — him we have 
already met; the other, John Holmes, who had served 
several terms in the Massachusetts Legislature, and 
who was, v/hen in 1820 Maine was admitted as a 
State of the Union, selected to represent her in the 
United States Senate. These two, like sensible men, 
gave up each a part of his individual opinion, and 
divided the islands, giving Moose, Dudley and Fred- 
erick Islands to the United States and the rest along 
with the Grand Manan to Nova Scotia. 

Then the boundary of the Great Lakes was not quite 
certain; and again Commissioners were appointed to 
settle it. Anthony Barclay (son of Thomas, whom we 
have met and shall meet again), took the part of British 
Commissioner in the place of John Ogilvy, who died 
at Amherstburg, Upper Canada, from a fever contracted 
in the discharge of his duties. Peter Buel Porter, who 
had been a very competent commander in the war and 
was to be Secretary for War in John Quincy Adams' 
Cabinet, was the other. They made an award at Utica. 
in 1822, wholly satisfactory then and now to all parties. 

A very difficult question of boundary still remained, 
"The Northeastern Boundary." The Treaty of 1783 



32 

spoke of the " Highlands," and the two nations could 
not agree on where the " Highlands " were. Thomas 
Barclay and Cornelius P. Van Ness, afterwards Chief 
Justice and Governor of Vermont, who were appointed 
Commissioners, were unable to agree, and the question 
was left, in 1827 to William, King of the Netherlands. 
His award in 1831 was not satisfactory to the United 
States, and Britain agreed not to insist upon it. After 
considerable negotiation, Lord Ashburton and Daniel 
Webster agreed upon a line (in 1842) which has been 
acted upon ever since. This line was and is exceedingly 
awkward for Canada, an elbow of Maine sticks up into 
her ribs, and her Intercolonial Railway has been com- 
pelled to make a long detour to avoid American territory, 
while there is no corresponding advantage to the United 
States. But the line was agreed upon and the matter 
is settled. 

This controversy illustrates, it seems to me, our 
manner of thought. The boundary as defined by the 
Treaty of 1783 neither party at any time attempted to 
get away from. When it was found that the words 
employed were not sufficiently definite to make clear 
the precise boundary intended, there was still no threat 
of war, much less forcible entry. Two commissioners 
were selected, lawyers of eminence, to find out exactly 
what was meant. They disagreed — a disagreement 
which might quite naturally arise from national feel- 
ings and prejudice: it was left to a foreigner — and a for- 
eigner in such high position that no thought of corruption 
or dishonesty could arise. His award was claimed by the 
United States as not having been made on the proper 
basis. Britain, in view of this claim, instead of insist- 
ing on the award, as technically she might, agreed to 
disregard it. I have thought that her conduct on this 
occasion may well be likened to that of the United 
States but last year. Britain claimed that the United 
States had bound itself not to give any advantage to 
its own ships in the Panama Canal; the United States 
took another view of the Treaty and made regulations 



33 

by which certain ships of the United States had an 
advantage. But on consideration of the view taken by 
Britain of the Treaty, it reversed its action and without 
assenting to the validity of the British contention, 
acceded to it because the other party to the treaty 
thought that was what the Treaty meant; nor was the 
plea of change of circumstances, earnestly pressed as 
it was, even listened to. May I, as one who loves the 
American people, say that to my mind they never rose 
to a higher plane of international good faith than when 
they said to Britain, " You thought we meant that, so 
let it be"? But as a Briton I venture to point to a 
precedent for this action, eighty-five years before, little 
known and little thought of. 

One school of politicians would say that both the 
nations were fools. What say you? 

This was by no means the end of the territorial 
disputes. 

The international boundary was, as we have seen, 
settled by Commissioners, at the East and through the 
Great Lakes and international rivers through the Lake of 
the Woods. In 1818 from the Lake of the Woods to the 
Rocky Mountains the parallel of 49" N.L. was agreed 
upon through diplomatic means ; but West of the Rockies 
the line was in dispute. The Convention of 1818 allowed 
the citizens of each nation to settle in the disputed terri- 
tory. Attempts were made in 1823 and 1826 to fix the 
line, but in vain. In 1827 the arrangement as to settle- 
ment by either people was renewed indefinitely. Britain 
claimed as far south as the mouth of the Columbia 
River, between 46" and 47'^ N.L., the United States as 
far north as 54" 40'. Polk's election was fought on the 
slogan " Fifty four forty or fight." Polk was elected, but 
no fight came on, although Britain firmly refused to assent 
to fifty-four forty; both parties thought it better to com- 
promise and (in 1846) they agreed that the line of 49'^ 
N.L. should be extended to the Pacific. Of course the 
jingoes on either side were outraged, each government 
was charged with craven submission to unjust demands 
of the other; true national feeling was again dead and 
the doom of the Empire — or the Republic — was sealed. 



34 

The troubles, however, were not over. Some British 
subjects had peaceably settled in the territory south of 
this line, and for land and improvements of which they 
were deprived, they asked to be paid. The United 
States cheerfully agreed to pay, and to determine the 
amount, two Commissioners were appointed. These 
were such unpatriotic men that they (in 1869) agreed 
upon the amount without even troubling the umpire, 
Benjamin R. Curtis. 

Even yet the whole matter was not got rid of. The 
Convention of 1846 had fixed the line at 49" to the 
middle of the channel which separates the continent from 
Vancouver Island and thence southerly through the 
middle of this channel and of Fuca Strait to the Pacific 
Ocean. Geography has a way of laughing at diplomacy. 
There were three channels, any of which might fairly 
be called the m.ain channel. Britain claimed that near- 
est the mainland, the United States that nearest Van- 
couver Island, and the intervening islands were the bone 
of contention. In 1869 it was arranged to leave the 
dispute to the determination of the President of Switzer- 
land, but the Senate refused to agree — the irritation 
which arose during the Civil War had not been allayed. 
British subjects settled in San Juan Island; General 
Harney landed an armed force and took possession of 
it for the United States; Britain had men-of-war avail- 
able and only prudence and forbearance prevented an 
armed conflict. But there was no war; a peaceful joint 
occupation was agreed upon, and in 1871 the Emperor 
of Germany was asked to decide the channel. This he 
did the following year in favor of the United States, and 
Britain withdrew. 

Then came the last dispute as to territory. The 
boundary of Alaska was for some time in doubt. Joint 
surveys agreed upon in 1892 did not satisfactorily deter- 
mine the true line, for it was not a matter of surveying. 
At length in 1903 the determination of the boundary 
was left to six " impartial jurists of repute " who made 
an award in the same year. The award was not received 



35 

with much favour in Canada; much complaint was made 
that some of the American Commissioners were not 
" impartial," and that the award was not in fact judicial. 
But there never was a thought of disputing its validity 
or of refusing to be bound by it. 

So we have fixed our four thousand miles of bound- 
ary without a fight, without the effusion of one drop of 
blood, without scarcely the lingering remains of a tem- 
porary irritation. 

The rights of fishing have also been in controversy. 
By the Treaty of Peace, 1783, certain rights were given 
to American citizens in the Atlantic fisheries. These 
were not as much as mentioned in the Treaty of Ghent 
of 1814 (the story is a curious one, but too long to be 
entered upon here) ; it was claimed by Britain that after 
the War of 1812 Americans had no right to fish in 
British territory, and a rather dangerous dispute arose. 
In 1818, however, the matter was arranged by diplo- 
macy, and the limits within which Americans might fish 
were laid down. When the Reciprocity Treaty was made 
in 1854, the advantages given up in 1818 by the Ameri- 
cans were restored so long as that treaty should be in 
force, and an international commission was provided for 
which should lay off the limits within which Americans 
should have the right to fish. In 1866 the United 
States denounced the Reciprocity Treaty and these 
rights were lost. But who ever heard of a fisherman 
who was content to fish only in his own waters and to 
give up fishing where he had been accustomed? Not 
unnaturally the American fishermen trespassed, and 
this caused no little irritation between the two peoples. 
In 1871, by the Treaty of Washington, the amount to 
be paid by the United States for this improper and 
illegal fishing was referred to three arbitrators, and 
they, in 1877, made an award at Halifax. The amount, 
five and a half million dollars, rather startled the United 
States but it was paid within the time allowed by the 
Treaty. 

The convention of 1818 had given to American citi- 
zens certain rights of drying and curing fish, etc., not 



36 

very definitely expressed; and constant friction arose 
over these matters. Then there were questions concern- 
ing the right of the British Colonies to make regulations 
as to fishing, bait, etc.; and generally the "fishing on 
the Banks " was a perpetual subject of diplomatic cor- 
respondence and controversy, charges and counter- 
charges of wrongdoing and unreasonableness. At 
length it was decided to leave the whole matter to a 
tribunal chosen from the members of the Permanent 
Court at the Hague — an American and a Canadian 
Judge, an Austrian professor of Law, a Dutchman and 
an Argentine, all " jurists of repute." Their award in 
1910 was so satisfactory that both parties were trium- 
phant, each hailed the decision as a victory for its side, 
and for once no one thought of " cursing the Court." 

All these questions, it will be seen, depended upon 
the interpretation of written documents, agreements 
made between the parties which neither party tried to 
repudiate but which were interpreted differently. There 
was, however, another matter not unlike the fishing dis- 
pute which did not depend on agreements but upon rules 
of international law involving dominion over the open 
sea. Russia's attempt at ownership of the Behring Sea 
had been protested against by both Britain and the 
United States; but shortly after the acquisition of this 
territory by the United States, legislation was passed at 
Washington which appeared to assert jurisdiction simi- 
lar to that which had been claimed by Russia. This had 
for its avowed object the preservation of the fur seal in 
Behring Sea. Even more definite claims of ownership 
of this sea were soon made by the United States. Cana- 
dian .vessels repudiated the authority of the United 
States and continued sealing in that part of the sea 
in which they had been accustomed. Some ships 
were seized, some Canadians imprisoned, some turned 
adrift in California. When we remember that the seizures 
were sixty miles from land, the serious nature of the 
claim to territorial sovereignty is apparent. This stare 
of affairs was intolerable: Canadians would seal Ameri- 
can cruisers would capture their ships and men. At 



37 

length in 1869 the matter was left to a Board of two 
Americans, one Englishman, one Canadian, and one 
from each of the countries France, Italy and Norway. 
Their award was made in Paris in 1893 and proved gen- 
erally satisfactory. The amount of damages to be paid 
Canadians, etc., was fixed by two judges, one an Ameri- 
can, the other a Canadian; no umpire was necessary, and 
the amount, nearly half a million, was paid without a 
murmur. 

Mere money claims have sometimes rested on posi- 
tive agreement, sometimes on the rules of international 
law. 

A very curious dispute arose over one of the terms of 
the Treaty of Ghent. By Article I it was agreed that all 
territory taken should be restored, without carrying 
away of slaves or other private property. Many slaves 
had come within the British lines, attracted by a pro- 
clamation which virtually promised them freedom. (It 
may be remarked en passant that it was this conduct 
of the British commanders which came in for the bit- 
terest comment by Americans, especially those of the 
South.) These quondam slaves had accompanied or 
preceded the British forces in their abandonment of 
American soil, and it was demanded that they should 
be returned or paid for. The British claim was a perfect 
example of legal hair-splitting and worthy of a special 
pleader; but it was in favorem libertatis, and a plea of 
that kind, like a plea in favorem vitae, has always been 
looked upon with favour in English-speaking courts. 
There was never any thought of delivering up the 
poor blacks, but the question of obligation to pay for 
them was an open one. It was finally left to the Czar 
of Russia, and he determined in favor of the contention 
of the United States. 

Partly by arbitration of four commissioners, and 
partly by diplomacy, the amount was fixed at about a 
million and a quarter dollars. That sum Britain paid 
and kept the negro. 

After the Treaty of Ghent many claims were made 
by American citizens against Britain for illegal seizures 



38 

of ships, etc., and by British subjects against the United 
States for the same causes of complaints, for arrest of 
British subjects, and the Hke. These were in 1853 
referred to a Board of three commissioners. Britain 
chose Edmund Hornby a lawyer of standing, who was 
afterwards Judge of British Courts in Constantinople 
and Hong Kong; the United States, Nathaniel G. 
Upham, for some years a Judge of the Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire. These two tried to induce Martin 
Van Buren, ex-President of the United States, to act as 
umpire, but he declined, and they then chose Joshua 
Bates, a member of the London banking firm of Baring 
Bros, and Co., but an American by birth, education and 
allegiance. As matters turned out each nation got an 
award about equal to that of the other. 

Another and a very serious dispute arose later, which 
could not be determined by any pre-existing agreement 
nor even by the rules of international law: there was no 
such agreement, and the parties did not agree as to the 
law. A claim was made by the United States for 
damage due directly, and for still more damage due 
indirectly, to Britain's conduct during the Civil War in 
allowing Confederate cruisers to be fitted up in her 
waters and to escape to destroy American shipping. 
A most unpleasant and dangerous controversy arose, 
inflamed beyond a doubt by the anger in the United 
States against the Old Land for the conduct of 
her governing classes during the crucial struggle for 
human liberty. War was in the air more than once; but 
both parties wished for what was right; neither thought 
it would be better to obtain what was right by means of 
war; and it ended by the two peoples (in 1871 ) agree- 
ing between themselves upon the principles which they 
should adopt as the law governing the case and leaving 
the determination of the amount to a tribunal of five — an 
English Chief Justice, an American publicist, an Italian 
judge, a Swiss advocate and a Brazilian professor of 
law constituted the Bench ; and their award, dissented 
from as it was by the British representative, was paid 
without demur. 



30 

By the same treaty (that of Washington, 1871) a 
Board was formed of three — an English and an Ameri- 
can judge, with an Itahan diplomat — to pass upon cer- 
tain claims arising from what was considered the 
unneutral conduct of Canada, also upon certain claims 
by British subiects for improper seizure and detention 
of ships, illegal arrests, destruction of property, etc., by 
the United States. None of the American claims was 
allowed; about two million dollars of the British claims 
were held valid. 

How do we stand at present? In the first place, we 
have made it impossible to have immediate naval warfare 
on our Lakes. As far back as 1817 it was agreed that 
there should be no ships of war upon the international 
waters. Then the United States and Canada have an 
agreement dating back to 1909 whereby a permanent 
Board is formed, composed of six members, three 
appointed by the United States, three by Canada. This 
Commission has jurisdiction over all cases involving the 
use, obstruction or diversion of the international waters; 
but also all matters of difference betv/een the countries 
involving the rights, obligations or interests of either in 
relation to the other, or the inhabitants of the other, 
along the frontier are to be referred to this commission 
for enquirv and report. Moreover, any matter or ques- 
tion of difference involving the rights, obligations or 
interests of the United States or Canada, either in rela- 
tion to each other or to their respective inhabitants, may 
be referred to it for decision. This commission I have 
more than once called " a miniature Hague Tribunal of 
our own, iust for us English-speaking nations of the con- 
tinent of North America." 

I need not speak of the general treaty of 1908 nor 
of the recent treaty which is meant to delay military 
operations and to give the nations a chance to consider 
their dispute in all its bearings. 

It is plain — he who runs may read — that we have 
been so satisfied with the Century of Peace that we are 
making every effort for its continuance ad niultos annos. 
In every way peace has paid. Let no one persuade him- 



40 

self that the war of one hundred years ago did anything 
to teach the peoples respect for each other or to bring 
them into harmony. Whatever may have been its effect, 
if any, in welding the Union together, internationally it 
was wholly evil, and its evil effects still continue. It was 
the peace, the ways of peace, which brought us together 
and made us almost one. What American but finds him- 
self at home in my Canada, what Canadian considers 
himself a foreigner or an alien in the United States? 

What of the future? 

I read that Maxim, the great inventor, says that 
after the present war the United States must fight 
the victor. I confess scepticism about the United States 
being forced to go to war with any people. I have heard 
many times of its being obliged to fight Britain: not 
many years ago, war with Germany was inevitable (over 
some nitrates, I think, and later in the interests of Stand- 
ard Oil) : Mexico has been its predestined victim dozens 
of times; and when no other antagonist is above the 
horizon, Japan invariably appears. 

But Alaxim may be right. He is undoubtedly right 
if that victor, be it which nation it may, hold as a car- 
dinal doctrine of international conduct that war is good 
in itself, that war is necessary for the highest develop- 
ment of a nation, or the like accursed creed. Any nation 
which believes — and does not simply say that it believes 
— that " the living God will see to it that war shall 
always recur as a terrible medicine for mankind," will ^ 
not fail itself to play the physician and administer the 
prescription if the Almighty seems not sufficiently atten- 
tive to His duty. 

And if the victor live the doctrine. Might makes 
Right, the time uill surely come when Right will be 
made bv Might; while in the meantime this Republic, 
to which countless thousands have fled for the chance 
to breathe v\'ithout the load of military conscription and 
tax, must in the meantime be ever prepared, paying for 
that preparation the inevitable price in money, anxiety 
and the brain and brawn of her sons — her sons who will 
thus learn, as no otherwise could they learn, what is 



41 

meant by the principle, " The citizen exists for the State, 
not the State for the citizen." If the victor be a nation 
which loves peace, which will seek peace and ensue it, 
which acknowledges that there are other and his/her 
rights than such as may be given by the will of the 
stronger, that the moral law is of validity in conduct 
towards other nations, that the pledged word must be 
kept, a nation that walketh uprightly and worketh 
righteousness and speaketh truth in its heart, sweareth 
to its own hurt and changeth not, then the nation which 
brought about the peace of Portsmouth, which showed 
its magnanimity in the Panama Canal, its altruism in 
the Spanish War, need fear no war — sum of all the 
villainies — for when war begins, then hell openeth. 

In New Orleans the other day I heard a distin- 
guished officer of the American Army urge that chil- 
dren should be taught to fight for their rights, for, said 
he, " if we do not fight for our rights we soon will have 
no rights to fight for." I ventured then, as I venture 
now, to say, God forbid that the time should ever come 
when those of our breed should need to be taught to fight 
for their rights. But there never was a time when your 
people or mine has required to be urged to fight for its 
rights; we always have been, are now and alv/ays will 
be, all too ready to fight for our rights. That is not the 
true difficulty or the matter of greatest importance. 
What is important is to determine what our rights are. 

No nation, as no individual, ever existed that can be 
wholly trusted to determine its own rights; impartiality 
is excluded in the nature of things; and it is the pugna- 
cious spirit, the spirit which is insistent to fight for 
rights, which is the greatest danger in our international 
relations- Any nation that is looking for a fight can 
always be accommodated. It was the curbing of that 
desire " to fight for our rights," and the careful deter- 
mination on principle of what these rights were, which 
made possible the Century of Peace. There always was, 
is now and always v/ill be a war party — of strong and 
patriotic men it is composed, no weaklings or traitors are 
to be found in it, and yet it is just such a party which 



42 

must be fought. The people must be convinced that 
while Alight is great, Right is greater, and it is not valour 
or prowess in arms hut Righteousness which exalteth 
a nation. 

Of the future of these two nations I am confident; 
but should we not pray and work — for laborare est orare 
— that their example may show the better way to all 
the nations of the earth so that " thev shall beat their 
swords into ploughshares and their spears into reaping 
hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, 
neither shall they learn war any more." 



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